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Abstract 
We use a large linked employer-employee data set to analyze the importance of relative 
wage positions in the context of individual quit decisions as an inverse measure of job 
satisfaction. Our main findings are: (1) Workers with higher relative wage positions 
within their firms are on average more likely to quit their jobs than workers with lower 
relative wage positions; and (2) workers, who experience a loss in their relative wage 
positions, are also more likely to have a wage cut associated with their job-to-job 
transition. The overall results therefore suggest that the status effect is dominated by an 
opposing signal effect. 
 
JEL-Classification: D03, J31, J62, J63, M52 
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1.   Introduction 
The empirical analysis of the impact of relative wage positions on workers' decisions to 
voluntary quit their job in the current firm is important in the context of two streams of 
the economic literature. On the one hand, the recent labor turnover literature points to 
the importance of fair wages and status concerns of workers as well as to the paradox 
that many workers experience a wage cut after a job-to-job transition (e.g., Galizzi and 
Lang, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006; Jolivet et al., 2006). On the other hand, our 
results can be incorporated into the broader literature about interdependent preferences 
and the determinants of subjective well-being (e.g., Hamermesh, 1975; Frank, 1985; 
Easterlin, 1995; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Clark et al., 2008), because quits are 
driven to some extent by utility maximizing behavior. With respect to both streams of 
the literature, we can contribute new empirical findings from linked employer-employee 
data, which allows us to compute measures for workers' relative wage positions within 
their firms and to assess their impact on important decisions in real world data, namely 
decisions to quit full-time employment. Our sample contains almost four million yearly 
observations of more than one million full-time employed male prime-age workers in 
nearly seven thousand West German firms for the period from 1996 to 2005.   
Our main results are that relative wage positions have a significant impact on the 
probability to voluntary quit a job and on the probability to accept a wage cut when 
changing firms. We find that a potential status effect is dominated by a potential signal 
effect, because workers with higher relative wage positions within their firms are on 
average more likely to quit a job than workers with lower relative wage positions. The 
former might expect fewer opportunities for further career advancement in their current   2
firm so that they switch to a different firm. This seems to be the case even if they have 
to accept a short-term wage cut in exchange for long-term career opportunities. Overall, 
we find evidence that workers' quit probabilities as inverse measure for utility (or 
subjective well-being) are not strongly influenced by status concerns. The opposing 
signal effect seems to be of much larger importance than the status effect, which has 
also been discussed in a recent study by Clark et al. (2009), who find in Danish linked 
employer-employee data that a worker's satisfaction is on average higher if co-workers 
earn higher mean wages holding the worker's own wage constant. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section illustrates briefly the basic 
theoretical framework and our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data set, 
main variables, and econometric models. In Section 4 we present our econometric 
results for the impact of relative wage positions on the individual quit probability and 
for the consequences of quits on absolute wages and relative wage positions. We 
conclude with a short summary in Section 5. 
 
2.  Basic theoretical framework and hypotheses 
The relationship between wages and individual quit behavior can be modeled in the 
framework of utility maximizing worker behavior. Utility U of individual i who works 
in firm j in period t in equation (1) is a simplified function of the individual absolute 
wage (
abs
ijt w ), the individual relative wage position within the firm (
rel
ijt w ), the relative 
wage position across firms (
rel
it w ), and other individual and job characteristics ( ijt X ). 
Moreover, we assume that the individual probability to voluntary quit a job in firm j in   3
period  t is negatively correlated with utility as described in equation (2) (Freeman, 
1978; Akerlof et al., 1988; Clark et al., 1998; Clark, 2001; Clark and Georgellis, 2006; 
Lévy-Garboua et al., 2007). 
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Standard economic theory (e.g., search models, efficiency wage models) accounts 
usually only for absolute wages, which should positively affect a worker's utility (Salop 
and Salop, 1976; Salop, 1979; Akerlof, 1982). Our main focus is however on workers' 
relative wage positions, which have received increasing attention in happiness research 
in the last two decades (Clark et al., 2008). The impact of the relative wage position 
within a firm (
rel
ijt w ), which includes wages of co-workers as comparison income, is 
however ambiguous (Clark et al., 2008; Clark et al., 2009). If the individual wage is 
held constant, higher wages of co-workers are associated with a lower relative wage 
position of an individual worker within his firm. On the one hand, a lower relative wage 
might be perceived as unfair and of low social status (Adams, 1965; Frank, 1984a, 
1984b; Garner, 1986; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Clark et al., 2009), which consequently 
decreases utility and increases the quit probability, ceteris paribus. This is called the 
'status effect'. On the other hand, the relative wage position within a firm can also cover 
a 'signal effect' as it provides workers with information about their own future income 
and career prospects (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973; Senik, 2008; Clark et al., 2009). 
Higher wages of co-workers might signal better career prospects in the firm, which   4
increases utility and decreases the quit probability. If a worker is however already high 
up in the pay scale, he cannot expect to have further career advancements in the current 
firm and consequently he might decide to quit his job and to join another firm.
1   
Hypothesis 1a: Workers are less likely to quit their job if they have a higher 
relative wage position within their firm ('status effect'>'signal effect'). 
Hypothesis 1b: Workers are more likely to quit their job if they have a higher 
relative wage position within their firm ('signal effect'>'status effect'). 
Job utility and quit probability are certainly not only affected by the present individual 
absolute wage and the relative wage position within the own firm but also by outside 
wages (Stiglitz, 1974; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Galizzi and Lang, 1998; Kim, 1999; 
Fairris, 2004; Bingley and Westergard-Nielsen, 2006). A low wage in comparison to 
workers with similar characteristics in different firms (low relative wage position across 
firms (
rel
it w )) implies that a worker can gain from quitting his current job and moving to 
another firm for three reasons. First, workers should be, ceteris paribus, more likely to 
change firms if they can earn higher absolute wages in other firms. Second, workers 
might perceive their wages unfair and of lower status if comparable workers in other 
firms earn higher relative wages. Third, a firm, in which workers earn higher relative 
wages than in other firms, might signal better career prospects so that workers of other 
firms might be convinced to join the 'high wage' firm. Overall, workers of 'high wage' 
firms, who have already a higher relative wage position than workers in other firms, 
have lower incentives to quit as they cannot gain much. 
                                                 
1 See Clark et al. (2009) for an extensive discussion of status and signal effects.   5
Hypothesis 2: Workers are less likely to quit their job if they have a higher 
relative wage position across firms. 
In a further step, our paper aims to shed some more light on the empirical observation 
that many mobile workers experience wage cuts. Table 1 outlines some results of recent 
studies on wage cuts induced by mobility. Mobility to a lower wage is common in the 
U.S. and Germany.
2 Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) report for Germany that about one 
quarter of mobility events is associated with a wage cut. Jolivet et al. (2006) find that 
about 36 percent of job-to-job transitions in Germany and 23 percent of transitions in 
the U.S. are to lower wages. Nosal and Rupert (2007) provide evidence for the U.S. that 
about two out of five (voluntarily) mobile individuals change to lower wages.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Theoretical approaches explain voluntary wage cuts mostly as investments in future 
wage growth (Galizzi and Lang, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Connolly and 
Gottschalk, 2009). These approaches have in common that individual decisions are 
reduced to a monetary maximization problem, in which workers maximize the long-run 
value of job opportunities. Nosal and Rupert (2007) suggest furthermore that job-
specific (non-wage) amenities affect the job choice and consequently individual 
mobility decisions. We expect relative wage positions to be one such amenity because 
of its fairness and status aspects. Thus, relative wage positions within a firm should 
affect the voluntary acceptance of wage cuts. The total effect is again ambiguous due to 
counter acting signal and status effects. On the one hand, workers might accept wage 
                                                 
2 See Jolivet et al. (2006) for a larger set of countries.   6
cuts if they can improve their status in the new firm, which is measured as a higher 
relative position in the new firm. On the other hand, workers might be more likely to 
accept a wage cut if they have better career prospects in the new firm, i.e., higher future 
wages, which is signaled by a lower current relative wage position. 
Hypothesis 3a: Workers trade off absolute wages and relative wage positions 
when changing firms ('status effect'>'signal effect'). 
Hypothesis 3b: Lower absolute wages and lower relative wage positions go hand 
in hand when workers change firms ('signal effect'>'status effect'). 
 
3.  Data and methodological remarks 
3.1 Data  set 
As we are interested in relative wage positions within firms, our estimation framework 
requires information about workers, co-workers, and their firms. It is furthermore 
desirable that the data set contains not only a small subsample of workers in each firm 
but as many workers as possible so that relative wage positions in each firm can be 
computed accurately. The German linked employer-employee data set of the Institute 
for Employment Research (‘Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung (IAB)’, 
LIAB in the following) fulfills these prerequisites (Alda et al., 2005). The LIAB links 
employer side information from the IAB Establishment Panel with employee 
information from process-produced person specific data. The IAB Establishment Panel 
is a yearly survey that includes a random sample of firms with at least one employee 
covered by social security. The sample is drawn from stratification cells of   7
establishment size classes and industries. The firms are asked about their employment 
structure, personnel policy, industrial relations etc. The process-produced person 
specific data stem basically from the notification procedure for unemployment, pension, 
and health insurances. Employers have to notify the social security agencies about all 
employees that are covered by social security at the start and at the end of an 
employment relationship as well as on the last day of each year. 
The underlying data set is set up as a panel of cross-sections from 1993 to 2006 at the 
corresponding record date of June 30. In the last period of the sample, the individuals 
cannot exactly be assigned to be movers or non-movers because we do not observe their 
subsequent employment status. The year 2006 is hence not subject to the analysis. 
Moreover, our analysis focuses on the years from 1996 onwards because sample size 
was considerably enlarged and information about collective contracts are only available 
for this time horizon. In sum 10 periods are available for our study. 
We restrict the sample to male full-time workers in the main job aged between 30 and 
55 years. Winkelmann (1994) shows that German workers hold on average four lifetime 
jobs and half of all lifetime job transitions are executed in the first ten years of their 
careers. Job shopping provides one interpretation for this pattern (Topel and Ward, 
1992). During the beginning of the career, young individuals learn about their abilities 
and productivity, the employer-employee match quality, and their own fair market 
wage. As we are interested in the effect of relative wage positions rather than learning 
related job shopping, we focus on workers exceeding 30 years of age. Analogously to 
Galizzi and Lang (1998), we limit the sample to men who are less than 55 years old as 
those workers might be more concerned with retirement decisions. Furthermore, only   8
full-time employed German citizens are included because no information about working 
hours is available in the data. Our analysis concentrates on establishments located in 
West Germany because of different labor market conditions in East and West Germany 
(e.g., unemployment, wages) and the fact that our data contain mostly West German 
firms. A methodological reason for the restriction is that some of the control variables 
are left-censored before unification in 1990. The data consequently report only a lower 
boundary for tenure and experience in East Germany. 
The data reveal some implausible low daily wages (Jacobebbinghaus, 2008). The 
analysis is responsive to these values and excludes wages below the marginal 
employment ceiling of 400 Euros per month. Hence, employees who earn less than 
13.33 Euros per day are dropped from the analysis. Another problem of the data is that 
wages are censored at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions. This 
implies that all wages above this ceiling are set to the corresponding value of the 
ceiling. To reduce the impact of the censoring, the sample is restricted to workers who 
do not have more than a high-school degree with an apprenticeship degree.
3  
Establishments with less than ten workers under the above restrictions are not subject to 
the analysis because we need to estimate earnings functions for single firms (degrees of 
freedom) and need sufficient wage variance within firms for our analysis of relative 
wage positions. Consideration of more than ten observations decreases the number 
                                                 
3 Note that imputation methods are available but imputation procedures increase the uncertainty about the 
relative wage positions of workers within an establishment. Moreover, it seems questionable if regular 
workers compare themselves with high wage employees in upper management positions.   9
mobility events rapidly.
4 The final sample for our analysis contains 3,867,569 yearly 
observations from 1,115,437 workers in 6,791 different firms in an unbalanced panel 
design for the period from 1996 to 2005. Only few observations (0.15 percent) comply 
with the upper earnings limit for social security contributions in our sample so that 
wage censoring is not of much concern.  
Our analysis of quit behavior relies on the assumption that individuals leave their 
employer voluntarily. Voluntary transitions are defined as an unconstrained choice of 
the worker. This criterion is hardly to implement using this data set, but the 
identification of voluntary quits is crucial for our analysis. The following conditions 
need to be met for the identification of quits. The worker is full-time employed in two 
successive periods in two different establishments. To assure that mobility is likely to 
be induced by the worker and not by the firm, information on the individual's 
employment relationship eight days before the new job started is consulted. If the 
worker was full-time employed at another establishment eight days before entering the 
new establishment, he is assumed to have voluntarily quit the job at his past employer 
because he switched establishments with virtually no unemployment spell.
5 Other types 
                                                 
4 Table A.1 in the appendix presents number of mobility events and number of observations for different 
samples with respect to annual observations per establishment.  
5 Following our definition of quits we cannot assure that all but that most transitions are voluntary. Jolivet 
et al. (2006, p. 882) note: "Surely, many of the quick job re-accessions at very short durations correspond 
to voluntary job changes [...]. Yet some of them are likely to reflect involuntary reallocation - essentially 
job losses followed by the immediate finding of a replacement job." Note that only 0.2 percent of the 
observations in our sample experience quits. This very low share is reasoned by the nature of our data set 
and voluntary quit variable, which is defined as changes from one firm to another firm in our data set. As   10
of mobility than voluntary quits (e.g., layoffs) are included for the computation of 
comparison wages, but they are excluded from the regression analysis of the 
determinants of quits. In sum, 7,785 mobility events are observed and 7,516 individuals 
are mobile up to four times. 
 
3.2 Wage  measures 
We have introduced three general wage variables in the theory section, which need to be 
generated from the data. At first, the individual absolute wage (
abs
ijt w ) is measured 
straightforward and is the log mean daily wage in Euros of individual i in firm j in year 
t. Moreover, we construct five different measures to analyze the relative wage position 
within a firm. Following the literature (Freeman, 1978; Akerlof et al., 1988; Topel and 
Ward, 1992; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Galizzi and Lang, 1998; Clark et al., 2009), the 
average wage of workers in a firm ( jt w ) is used as comparison income.
6 Holding the 
individual wage constant, an increase of the average wage is associated with a lower 
individual relative wage position. As a second measure for comparison income, we use 
predicted inside wages ( ˆ
inside
ijt w ) obtained from separately estimated earnings functions 
                                                                                                                                               
our sample contains a little less than one percent of the entire relevant population of firms in West 
Germany, we can only observe a low share of quits. Our randomized sample of firms should however 
mitigate this possible problem, because workers with observed quits should not be different from workers 
who voluntary change to firms not included in our sample. 
6 The data reports a lower boundary of the average wage within the establishment because of the 
censoring. As only 0.15 percent of our sample is censored, this problem can be neglected in our analysis.   11
for every firm in every year.
7 Included worker characteristics are schooling, potential 
experience, squared experience, and occupation.
8 The earnings function looks as in 
equation (3), in which  denotes the firm-specific constant,  the coefficients for worker 
characteristics X, and  the residual term. 
       (3)   
' inside
ijt j it it wX      
We also construct measures which might be intuitively more appealing in the context of 
relative wage positions as they actually measure the individual wage position. 
Following Brown et al. (2008)
9, we construct the wage rank as well as the wage range 
of a worker within his firm so that both variables lie in the unit interval (0, 1). Values of 
one indicate that the individual is at the top of the pay scale.
10 The wage rank measures 
                                                 
7 This approach closely follows Clark and Oswald (1996) and Senik (2008), who include predicted wages 
conditional on schooling, occupation, sector, region, and other variables in satisfaction equations. The 
authors interpret the predicted wages as comparison income of individuals. 
8 We do not include tenure in these estimates because the comparison group should also include 
comparable workers at later career stages (career prospects). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
A.2 in the Appendix. 
9 Brown et al. (2008) draw on insights from research in psychology and the range frequency theory 
(Parducci, 1965) to analyze the impact of wage positions within a firm on workers' satisfaction with 
different job related items. They find that workers with higher relative wage positions are more satisfied 
with their pay, influence, achievement, and respect.  
10 The exact values cannot be computed due to the upper censoring of wages, which might lead to a 
compression of our rank and range measures. Since only 0.15 percent of our sample is censored, this issue 
is not of large concern in our analysis.   12
the normalized rank of individual i in firm j in period t as proportion of the number of 
workers in firm j in period t 
(    'rank of worker   in   in  ' 1 'number of workers in   in  '  1
rank
ijt w ijt jt   ). A higher 
rank indicates that the worker is higher up the pay scale in his firm. The wage range 
measures the normalized distance of individual i‘s wage in firm j in period t to the 
maximum wage in his firm as proportion of the wage spread between the highest and 
the lowest wage in the firm (    
min max min range
ijt ijt jt jt jt ww w w w   ). The individual wage 
rank indicates in an ordinal sense and the individual wage range in a cardinal sense a 
worker’s position in his firm’s wage hierarchy. The impact of both variables can be 
compared to assess if the ordinal rank (wage rank) or the cardinal rank (wage range) is 
more important to workers (Fields and Fei, 1978; Brown et al., 2008).      
A further measure of the relative wage position within a firm, which is very closely 
related with the previous two measures and especially with wage rank, is calculated on 
the basis of the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) for each establishment 
in each period (
CDF
ijt w ). Equally paid workers get the same cumulative value. 
Analogously to wage rank and wage range, a larger value implies a higher relative wage 
position within the firm and the variable is restricted to the unit interval (0, 1). 
At last, the relative wage position across firms is measured as the predicted comparison 
wage. In an ideal setting we would be able to observe the full distribution of individual 
outside wage offers a worker can choose from. As this is not the case in reality, we 
solve this problem by estimating an earnings function across all individuals in all firms 
for every year and then predict the outside wage ( ˆ
outside
it w ) for every individual by the 
obtained results. The predicted wage can also be interpreted as an expected outside   13
wage offer, i.e., the average wage a worker with the same characteristics in the same 
sector and in the same geographical area earns. The earnings function looks as in 
equation (4), in which  denotes the annual constant,  the coefficients for worker 
characteristics  X (schooling, potential experience, squared experience, and 
occupation)
11,  the coefficients for sector S and geographical area A, and  the residual 
term. 




it it it it it wX S A        
Table 2 summarizes the definitions of our wage measures. Table 3 presents means, 
standard deviations, and the correlations between the constructed wage measure. As 
already noted by Brown et al. (2008, p. 372), the wage measures are of course 
somewhat correlated and contain quite similar information. Therefore, we only account 
for one of the relative measures in a single specification when estimating the 
determinants of quits and compare their effects. In case of 
rank
ijt w  and 
range
ijt w , we compare 
the impact of ordinal and cardinal ranks. Furthermore, 
CDF
ijt w  provides a valuable 
robustness check on the effect of the ordinal wage rank. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
11 We did not incorporate tenure or workplace characteristics in the earnings function because our aim is 
to predict individual wages across firms and to use the predictions as comparison income. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix.    14
3.3 Econometric  models 
Our basic estimation framework looks as in equation (5), in which Quit* denotes the 
latent individual quit probability,  the constant,  the coefficients of our wage 
variables 
abs
ijt w  and 
r
ijt w  for which we incorporate the different relative wage measures 
discussed in the previous section ( jt w ,  ˆ
inside
ijt w , 
rank
ijt w , 
range
ijt w , 
CDF
ijt w ,  ˆ
outside
it w ),   the 
coefficients of worker characteristics X (schooling degree, tenure, squared tenure, 
potential experience
12, squared experience, occupation),  the coefficients of firm 
characteristics Y (share of unskilled workers in establishment, number of employees, 
works council, collective contract, sector, federal state),  time fixed effects, and  the 
remaining residual term. For descriptive statistics of the variables see Table A.2 in the 
Appendix. 




ijt ijt ijt it jt t ijt Quit w w X Y             
As the quit probability (Quit*) cannot be observed but only the actual quit behavior (see 
equation (6)), our dependent variable is binary and we apply the individual random 
effects Probit model in equation (7), in which  is the cumulative density function of 
the standard normal distribution and  i   is the individual random effect.
13  
                                                 
12 Potential experience is calculated with respect to individual labor market entry. Hence, possible spells 
in unemployment or apprenticeships directly following after school are accounted for. 
13 Since quits are a rare event, linear models cannot be applied. Moreover, the incidental parameter 
problem arises for individual fixed effects Probit models because our panel is too short with an average 
panel length of 3.5 years (Heckman, 1981). We thus apply an individual random effects Probit model to   15
   (6) 
1     if worker   quits his job in firm   in period 













ijt ijt ijt it jt t i Quit w w X Y               
In addition to the determinants of individual quit behavior, we also analyze the 
consequences of quits. Many empirical studies report a large share of workers who 
experience an individual wage loss when changing firms, which might be explained by 
factors like future wage growth, non-pecuniary rewards, and other job characteristics 
(Bartel and Borjas, 1981; Bartel, 1982; Ruhm, 1987; Akerlof et al., 1988; Polsky, 1999; 
Yankow, 2003; Nosal and Rupert, 2007; Connolly and Gottschalk, 2008; Schneck, 
2009a). We extend this perspective by our measures for the relative wage position 
within firms introduced in the previous section (
rank
ijt w , 
range
ijt w , 
CDF
ijt w ). As discussed in 
Section 2, utility and quit probabilities also depend on status from relative wage 
positions as well as on signals for career advancement opportunities. For example, a 
quitting worker might experience a loss in absolute wages but is compensated by a gain 
in status. It is, therefore, straightforward to compare not only the differences between 
individual wages in the old and the new firm but also the differences between relative 
wage measures in the new and the old firm. For this purpose, non-parametric methods 
like kernel density estimates of the differences can give first insights.  
Moreover, it is possible to regress the absolute wage difference on the difference in 
relative wage positions to assess possible tradeoffs in the utility function. Equation (8) 
                                                                                                                                               
exploit the panel nature of the data set. Because of our interest in average comparison wages within a 
firm, which do not vary across workers in one firm, we do not control for firm fixed effects.   16
presents the estimation framework, in which  
new old
it ww   is the difference of 
individual absolute wages between the new and the old firm,  the constant,  the 
coefficients of the differences in relative wage measures (
rank
ijt w , 
range
ijt w , 
CDF
ijt w ) between 
the new and the old firm,   the coefficients of worker characteristics X (schooling 
degree, change in establishment size class, potential experience, squared experience,),  
time fixed effects, and  the usual remaining residual term. This estimation framework 
further allows us to investigate which socio-demographic groups (e.g., low skilled) are 
more affected by wage cuts. 
  (8)    
', , ' new old r new r old
it t it it it ww w w X           
If workers accept lower absolute wages in the new firm because they are compensated 
with higher status, i.e., higher relative wage positions, we would expect the coefficients 
‘s to be negative. However, if the signal effect of better career opportunities 
dominates, we would expect the coefficients ‘s to be positive. As robustness check an 
additional Probit regression for accepting a wage cut can be estimated that is presented 
in equation (9). The dependent variable takes the value one in case of a wage cut and 
zero otherwise (see equation (10)) so that the expected signs of the coefficients ‘s 
reverse compared to the regression in equation (8). 
   (9)     
', , ' Pr 1
rn e w ro l d
it it t it WageCut w w X           
   (10)  

1     if  0








     
   
   17
 
4. Econometric  results 
4.1  Determinants of quits 
This section presents the results of the individual random effects Probit model as 
discussed in equation (7) in Section 3.3. Likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis 
of no individual unobserved heterogeneity in all specifications, which indicates that the 
random effects Probit model is more appropriate than the simple cross section Probit 
model. In the following, we discuss only marginal effects of our wage variables at the 
means of all covariates and under the assumption that the individual error term is zero. 
Note that the estimated absolute marginal effects might seem very small and not of 
economic significance at first glance. As the mean probability is however also very 
small, the relative marginal effects are in fact quite sizeable.
14 The complete estimation 
output and the corresponding coefficients are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
15  
The first specification in Table 4 contains the results for the quit probability without 
relative wage measures. The absolute wage (
abs
ijt w ) has a significant positive effect on 
the quit probability, which holds also in the next specifications. An increase of the 
absolute wage by one log point increases the quit probability by about 0.02 percentage 
points or by about 60 percent, respectively. This result is counter-intuitive as we would 
                                                 
14 For example, an absolute marginal effect of 0.0001 is a relative marginal effect of 33.3 percent if the 
mean predicted probability is only 0.0003. 
15 We also performed all subsequent estimates with a subsample of individuals who work in firms with at 
least one quit. As our main results are robust, the results are only displayed in Table A.4 in the Appendix.     18
expect that a worker's utility depends positively on his wage. Galizzi and Lang (1998) 
report also that workers with a higher absolute wage have on average a higher quit 
probability. One reason might be better outside job opportunities for better paid workers 
because differences in wages might reflect to some degree unobserved productivity 
differences in the estimates. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The next specifications include our variables of main interest, i.e., the relative wage 
measures discussed in Section 3.2. In these estimates the absolute wage is only a control 
variable to discuss the results for our relative wage measures from a ceteris paribus 
perspective, i.e., we interpret the effects when holding the individual absolute wage 
constant. Specification two includes the average wage in a worker's firm ( jt w ). Holding 
the own wage constant a higher average wage is a higher comparison income, meaning 
that the own relative wage position is lower. Because the average wage has a negative 
effect on the individual quit probability, workers with a lower relative wage position 
have on average a lower quit probability. If the mean log wage in a firm increases by 
one point, workers' quit probabilities decrease on average by about 0.025 percentage 
points or about 70 percent, respectively. In the third specification, we include the 
predicted inside wage ( ˆ
inside
ijt w ) as comparison income. The effect is again negative and 
can be interpreted in the same way as before. These findings correspond with previous 
findings about quits (Galizzi and Lang, 1998; Bingley and Westergard-Nielsen, 2006).  
Specification four includes the wage rank within the firm (
rank
ijt w ), which has a 
significant positive effect on the quit probability. This result is consistent with our   19
previous estimates for comparison incomes because workers with a higher wage rank 
have on average a higher quit probability and vice versa. The effect of wage range 
(
range
ijt w ) in specification five has a negative but not significant effect, which might 
indicate that the cardinal rank (wage range) is less important than the ordinal rank (wage 
rank). That the ordinal rank increases the quit probability and is of high significance, is 
also found in specification six for the position in the wage CDF (
CDF
ijt w ).  
Overall, the results show that workers with higher relative wage positions within their 
firm have on average significant higher quit probabilities.
16 Consequently, we find more 
support for our Hypothesis 1b than 1a. As we cannot distinguish between the status and 
the signal effect of relative wage positions, we can only conclude that at least in our 
sample the signal effect dominates the status effect. Therefore, it seems as workers react 
more strongly to opportunities for career advancement than to fairness and status 
concerns. Our findings somehow contradict the results of Brown et al. (2008), who find 
that workers with higher wage ranks are more satisfied, which would lead to a lower 
quit probability in our context. Other empirical results for satisfaction are however 
mixed. Clark et al. (2009) report that individual satisfaction is higher if co-workers earn 
higher wages. Clark and Oswald (1996) find that a higher comparison income decreases 
job satisfaction and satisfaction with pay. McBride (2001) and Stutzer (2004) report 
lower subjective well-being if comparison and aspiration income is higher. Senik (2008) 
finds mixed evidence for different countries.  
                                                 
16 Note that differences in relative wage positions are unlikely to reflect unobserved productivity 
differences as these should be covered by the individual absolute wage.   20
Specification seven includes the predicted outside wage ( ˆ
outside
it w ) as a proxy for the 
relative wage position across firms and possible outside wage offers. The effect is 
positive, which can be interpreted in the way that holding the own wage constant, a 
higher comparison wage across all firms, which is associated with a lower relative wage 
position in the current firm and the chance of higher earnings in other firms, increases 
the quit probability. This is in line with our Hypothesis 2 that workers are less likely to 
quit their job if they have already a higher relative wage position across firms because 
they cannot gain much from changing firms.
17 Bingley and Westergard-Nielsen (2006) 
find analogously that predicted alternative wages positively affect the individual quit 
probability. Fairris (2004) reports evidence from establishment data that firms, which 
pay on average wages below the industry and geographical area means, have higher quit 
rates.  
 
4.2  Consequences of quits 
In this section, we analyze the consequences of quits with respect to absolute wages and 
relative wage positions within a firm. More precisely, we are interested in the tradeoff 
between absolute wages and relative wage positions after a job change and the question 
whether mobile workers are compensated for wage cuts by increasing their relative 
wage positions, i.e., by a gain in status. As discussed in Section 2, previous studies have 
found most voluntary job mobility to be associated with wage gains but also that a 
                                                 
17 As the standard error is quite large, the effect of the predicted outside wage is however statistically not 
significant.   21
significant share of quits is accompanied with wage cuts. In our sample, which includes 
now only observations with a job-to-job transition between firms, 28.5 percent of 
workers experience a wage cut when changing the firm. This number has about the 
same size as in previous studies for Germany (Jolivet et al., 2006; Fitzenberger and 
Garloff, 2007). 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics about changes in absolute wages 
new old
it ww   
and relative wage positions within the new and the old firm ( 
new old
it rank rank  , 

new old
it range range  , 
new old
it CDF CDF  ). On average workers gain 0.03 log points 
in wages when changing the firm. The consequences are, however, quite heterogeneous 
as can be seen from the separated analysis for workers with wage cuts and wage 
markups. Workers with a wage cut receive on average 0.12 log points lower wages, 
while workers with a wage markup receive on average 0.09 log points higher wages. 
For our ordinal wage rank measures 
rank
ijt w and 
CDF
ijt w , we find that the average mobile 
worker has a lower relative wage position in the new firm. The cardinal wage range 
measure (
range
ijt w ) is on the other hand slightly positive. One might be tended to 
misleadingly conclude that the average gain in absolute wages and loss in ordinal 
relative wage positions is in support of our Hypotheses 3a that workers tradeoff absolute 
wages and relative wage positions when changing firms ('status effect'). If we look at 
workers with wage cuts, we see however that those workers also suffer from lower 
relative wage positions, whereas workers with wage markups also gain in their relative 
wage positions. Thus, the first descriptive findings are more in line with our Hypothesis 
3b that lower (higher) absolute wages and lower (higher) relative wage positions go   22
hand in hand when workers change firms. The rationale behind this finding is that 
workers are more likely to accept wage cuts if they start at a lower relative wage 
position in the new firm as they have more space for career advancements ('signal 
effect'). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In the following, we present Epanechnikov kernel density estimators for changes in 
relative wage positions, which distinguish between mobile workers with wage cuts and 
wage markups, to shed some more light into the heterogeneous consequences of quits. 
Figure 1 displays exemplary the distributions of changes in the wage positions in the 
CDF, which look very similar for wage rank and wage range. The aforementioned 
results for the separate samples of movers with wage cuts and wage markups hold in 
general also here. Most workers who suffer from wage cuts in the period of mobility 
also lose in relative wage position. In contradiction, most mobile workers with wage 
markups do not experience much change in their relative wage positions. It can 
nevertheless be seen that more mobile workers with wage markups gain than lose with 
respect to the relative wage position. Overall only few workers seem to accept wage 
cuts in order to improve their relative wage positions and to gain additional status. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The kernel density estimators do not account for further determinants of consequences 
of quits. Thus, we use linear regressions to regress changes in absolute wages on 
changes in relative wage positions and a set of control variables (see equation (8) in 
Section 3.3 for the econometric model and Table A.5 in the Appendix for descriptive 
statistics). The results in Table 6 support our previous findings that changes in absolute   23
wages and changes in relative wage positions are positively correlated. We further 
estimate Probit models for the determinants of accepting wage cuts (see equation (9) in 
Section 3.3). Table 7 presents the estimated marginal effects. The results show that 
workers who improve their relative wage positions are less likely to experience a wage 
cut.
18 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The results in Table 6 and Table 7 also give insights into the question which groups are 
more likely to suffer from wage cuts. Workers with lower educational levels are more 
likely to experience a wage cut when changing firms. This finding might be reasoned by 
bad job opportunities for unskilled workers. Specifications one and three suggest that 
workers who are mobile to larger establishments
19 are significantly less likely to suffer 
from wage cuts. This result corresponds with findings about positive wage premiums in 
larger firms, which are reasoned for example by efficiency wages (e.g., Brown and 
Medoff, 1989; Idson and Oi, 1999). Potential  experience has a negative impact on wage 
                                                 
18 As a robustness check, we repeated the Probit estimates for a subsample of quitting workers who 
switch between large firms with at least 1,000 employees. The results show that the relative wage effects 
are even larger than in the complete sample (see Table A.6 in the Appendix). 
19 Mobility to larger establishments is defined as a binary variable, which takes the value one if the new 
firm is in a larger establishment size class as defined in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Mobility to larger 
establishments is quite common as 56 percent of transitions are executed to establishments in a larger 
establishment size class.   24
changes associated with quits but an insignificant effect on the probability to accept a 
wage cut. 
In sum, our analysis does not provide evidence that wage cuts are accepted in exchange 
for an increase in status associated with higher relative wage positions. Workers who 
suffer from decreasing relative wage positions are in fact also more likely to suffer from 
wage cuts induced by mobility and vice versa. On the one hand, this finding can be 
interpreted from the point of view that mobile workers with wage cuts are 'double 
losers' because of their additional loss in status. If these workers, on the other hand, do 
not care much about status but about their chance for career advancement, a lower 
relative wage position might signal such better future career opportunities and 
consequently the quit decision would be rational. Consistent with this argument, Fairris 
(2004) finds evidence that firms have on average lower quit rates if internal promotions 
and seniority are important and job ladders are long. Overall, we find more support for 




Our main results are that relative wage positions have a significant impact on the 
probability to voluntary quit a job and on the probability to accept a wage cut when 
changing firms. We find that a possible status effect is dominated by a possible signal 
effect, because workers with higher relative wage positions within their firms are more 
likely to quit a job than workers with lower relative wage positions. The former might 
expect fewer opportunities for further career advancement in their current firm so that   25
they switch to a different firm. This might be even the case if they have to accept a 
short-term wage cut in exchange for new career opportunities. Workers with lower 
relative wage positions within their firm have on the other hand still much space for 
career advancement in their current firm, which would make quits unnecessary in this 
context. Our results imply that better relative wage positions are not the often cited 
factor to reduce quits, because they have the counter acting effect of signaling workers 
few further career advancement opportunities. 
As quits are driven to some extent by utility maximizing behavior, our results can also 
be incorporated into the broader literature about the determinants of subjective well-
being. That the status effect is dominated by a counter acting signal effect has also been 
found in other recent studies about comparison income and satisfaction (Senik, 2008; 
Clark et al., 2009). One limitation of our study, which we have in common with 
previous studies, is that we cannot separately identify status and signal effects of 
relative wage positions. Future research should therefore emphasize the distinction 
between status and signal and try to separate their effects. Our paper is nevertheless 
important because it shows that some previous results on comparison income, which are 
mostly based on survey data and laboratory experiments, are also found in real world 
data about important decisions in peoples' life, which do not suffer from a subjectivity 
bias and from the critique of unrealistic laboratory environments (Falk and Heckman, 
2009). 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Mobility events and annual observations 
 Sample  Means 
Annual observations per 
establishment  N10 N15 N50 N100 
Number  of  mobility  events  7,785 7,672 7,037 6,323 
Number  of  observations  3,867,569 3,843,919 3,639,961 3,382,528 





   32




Quit = 1  0.0020  0.0448 
abs
ijt w   4.6437 0.2414 
jt w   4.6415 0.1585 
inside
ijt w ˆ    4.6414   0.2048 
rank
ijt w   0.5002 0.2837 
range
ijt w   0.6309 0.2371 
CDF
ijt w   0.5127 0.2954 
outside
it ˆ w   4.6378 0.1701 
Tenure (years)  12.9425  7.7708 
Tenure squared  227.8940  220.7135
Potential experience (years)  19.2799  6.1179 
Potential experience squared  409.1431  225.5760
Professional status (dummies)     
Unskilled worker
i   0.2788  0.4484 
Skilled worker/ Craftsman
ii   0.3423  0.4745 
Technician/ Foreman
iii   0.0333  0.1793 
Clerk
iv 0.3456  0.4756 
Highest schooling degree (dummies)     
Secondary school leaving certificate
v 0.1197  0.3246 
Secondary school leaving certificate and apprenticeship
vi 0.8183  0.3856 
(Technical) college entrance qualification
vii 0.0090  0.0944 
(Technical) college entrance qualification and apprenticeship
viii 0.0529 0.2239 
Share of unqualified workers within the establishment  0.2700  0.2475 
Establishment size class (dummies)     
Workforce of establishment in [10;49]  0.0122  0.1096 
Workforce of establishment in [50;199]  0.0670  0.2500 
Workforce of establishment in [200;999]  0.2634  0.4405 
Workforce of establishment in [> 1000] 0.6575  0.4746 
Works council  0.9667  0.1795 
Collective bargaining  0.9528  0.2120 
Sector (dummies) 
Agriculture 0.0009  0.0297 
Mining 0.0474  0.2126 
Building 0.0144  0.1192 
Credit 0.0559  0.2297 
Traffic 0.0498  0.2176 
Retail 0.0297  0.1698 
Hotel 0.0055  0.0742 
Education 0.0118  0.1079 
Service 0.0308  0.1728 
Welfare 0.0285  0.1665   33
Public utility  0.0598  0.2371 
Production 0.6654  0.4719 
Federal region (dummies) 
Schleswig Holstein  0.0277  0.1641 
Hamburg 0.0623  0.2418 
Lower Saxony
ix 0.1416  0.3486 
Bremen 0.0221  0.1470 
North Rhine-Westphalia
x   0.2672  0.4425 
Hesse (Hessen)  0.0870  0.2819 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1339  0.3405 
Bavaria
xi   0.1579  0.3647 
Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland
xii   0.1003  0.3004 
Time-fixed effects (dummies)     
Year: 1996  0.1102  0.3131 
Year: 1997  0.0926  0.2899 
Year: 1998  0.0883  0.2838 
Year: 1999  0.0849  0.2787 
Year: 2000  0.0987  0.2982 
Year: 2001  0.1069  0.3090 
Year: 2002  0.1124  0.3158 
Year: 2003  0.0956  0.2940 
Year: 2004  0.1091  0.3118 
Year: 2005  0.1013  0.3018 
    
Number of observations  3,867,569 
Number of individuals  1,115,437 
Number of establishments  6,791 
Note: German terms: 
i)      nicht formal qualifiziert 
ii)     Facharbeiter 
iii)    Meister, Poliere 
iv)    Angestellter 
v)     bis mittlere Reife ohne Berufsausbildung 
vi)    bis mittlere Reife mit Berufsausbildung 
vii)   bis (Fach-)Hochschulreife ohne Berufsausbildung 
viii)  bis (Fach-)Hochschulreife mit Berufsausbildung 
ix)    Niedersachsen 
x)     Nordrhein Westfalen 
xi)    Bayern 
xii)   Rheinland Pfalz, Saarland 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Table A.3: Random-effects Probit results for quit probability 
Quit=1  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
abs
ijt w   0.1623  0.2280 0.2874 0.0645 0.1914 0.0129 0.1612 
 (0.0241)  (0.0279) (0.0318) (0.0313) (0.0369)  (0.0322) (0.0242)
jt w     -0.1921       
    (0.0405)      
ˆ
inside
ijt w       -0.2879      
      (0.0472)     
rank
ijt w        0.1107     
       (0.0228)      
range
ijt w         -0.0349    
        (0.0334)    
CDF
ijt w          0.1571   
           (0.0227)  
ˆ
outside
it w           0.0782 
            (0.1804)
Tenure  -0.0417  -0.0419 -0.0421 -0.0421 -0.0417 -0.0421 -0.0417 
 (0.0021)  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)  (0.0021) (0.0021)
Tenure squared  0.0009  0.0009  0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001)
Potential experience  0.0076  0.0074 0.0103 0.0073 0.0077 0.0071 0.0062 
 (0.0037)  (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)  (0.0037) (0.0050)
Potential experience squared  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001)
Secondary school leaving   0.1482  0.1507  0.1617  0.1507  0.1482  0.1527  0.1418 
certificate & apprenticeship  (0.0177)  (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0229)
(Technical) college entrance   0.1147  0.1215  0.1362  0.1215  0.1149  0.1190  0.1035 
qualification (0.0445)  (0.0445) (0.0446) (0.0445) (0.0445)  (0.0445) (0.0514)
(Technical) college entrance   0.2929  0.2970  0.3175  0.2973  0.2929  0.2976  0.2807 
qualification & apprenticeship  (0.0237)  (0.0237) (0.0241) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0367)
Skilled worker/ Craftsman  0.0105  0.0084  0.0217  0.0064  0.0104  0.0057  0.0049 
 (0.0127)  (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0127)  (0.0128) (0.0182)
Technician/  Foreman  -0.1036  -0.1166 -0.0516 -0.1191 -0.1027 -0.1237 -0.1283 
 (0.0305)  (0.0306) (0.0317) (0.0307) (0.0305)  (0.0306) (0.0647)
Clerk 0.0536  0.0467  0.0999  0.0459 0.0541 0.0419 0.0311 
 (0.0147)  (0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0147) (0.0147)  (0.0148) (0.0540)
Year:  1997  0.0591  0.0598 0.0610 0.0595 0.0588 0.0605 0.0583 
 (0.0220)  (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220)  (0.0220) (0.0221)
Year:  1998  0.0656  0.0689 0.0707 0.0682 0.0650 0.0702 0.0637 
 (0.0222)  (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222)  (0.0222) (0.0226)
Year:  1999  0.2463  0.2532 0.2544 0.2518 0.2447 0.2552 0.2427 
 (0.0208)  (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208)  (0.0208) (0.0224)
Year:  2000  0.3131  0.3211 0.3236 0.3195 0.3117 0.3230 0.3093 
 (0.0193)  (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0193)  (0.0194) (0.0211)  35
Year:  2001  0.2396  0.2503 0.2527 0.2482 0.2384 0.2527 0.2345 
 (0.0197)  (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0198)  (0.0198) (0.0229)
Year:  2002  0.0339  0.0471 0.0494 0.0447 0.0318 0.0501 0.0274 
 (0.0215)  (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216)  (0.0216) (0.0262)
Year:  2003  0.0673  0.0851 0.0888 0.0814 0.0624 0.0902 0.0582 
 (0.0222)  (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0227)  (0.0224) (0.0305)
Year:  2004  0.2348  0.2544 0.2578 0.2505 0.2304 0.2599 0.2241 
 (0.0201)  (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0205)  (0.0204) (0.0317)
Year:  2005  0.2140  0.2355 0.2390 0.2310 0.2090 0.2417 0.2029 
 (0.0206)  (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0212)  (0.0210) (0.0330)
Workforce [50;199]  0.0470  0.0490 0.0480 0.0485 0.0477 0.0528 0.0469 
 (0.0348)  (0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0348)  (0.0349) (0.0348)
Workforce [200;999]  -0.0045  0.0013  0.0017  0.0011  -0.0028  0.0071  -0.0048 
 (0.0341)  (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0341)  (0.0342) (0.0341)
Workforce  [>1000]  -0.0491  -0.0354 -0.0331 -0.0360 -0.0458 -0.0287 -0.0495 
 (0.0344)  (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346)  (0.0346) (0.0344)
Schleswig  Holstein  -0.1483  -0.1513 -0.1513 -0.1507 -0.1483 -0.1523 -0.1465 
 (0.0322)  (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0322)  (0.0322) (0.0325)
Hamburg  -0.0611  -0.0538 -0.0553 -0.0549 -0.0609 -0.0541 -0.0666 
 (0.0223)  (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)  (0.0223) (0.0256)
Lower Saxony   -0.0349  -0.0341  -0.0325  -0.0339  -0.0351  -0.0349  -0.0363 
 (0.0183)  (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183)  (0.0183) (0.0186)
Bremen 0.4534  0.4551  0.4565 0.4545 0.4530 0.4547 0.4520 
 (0.0228)  (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0228)  (0.0228) (0.0230)
North  Rhine-Westphalia  -0.1270  -0.1254 -0.1264 -0.1258 -0.1276 -0.1256 -0.1287 
 (0.0169)  (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)  (0.0169) (0.0173)
Hesse    -0.2241  -0.2197 -0.2221 -0.2203 -0.2238 -0.2211 -0.2254 
 (0.0224)  (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224)  (0.0224) (0.0226)
Baden Wuerttemberg  0.2126  0.2243 0.2246 0.2222 0.2114 0.2249 0.2071 
 (0.0168)  (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0168)  (0.0169) (0.0210)
Bavaria    -0.1001  -0.0999 -0.1013 -0.0991 -0.0999 -0.1009 -0.0998 
 (0.0183)  (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183)  (0.0183) (0.0183)
Works  council  -0.1685  -0.1531 -0.1527 -0.1566 -0.1705 -0.1510 -0.1685 
 (0.0221)  (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0222)  (0.0223) (0.0221)
Structure  -0.1504  -0.1713 -0.1615 -0.1680 -0.1491 -0.1732 -0.1505 
 (0.0170)  (0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0171)  (0.0168) (0.0170)
Collective bargaining  0.1609  0.1600 0.1628 0.1599 0.1605 0.1610 0.1608 
 (0.0214)  (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0214)  (0.0215) (0.0214)
Agriculture  -0.3532  -0.3789 -0.3839 -0.3722 -0.3484 -0.3837 -0.3340 
 (0.2018)  (0.2022) (0.2022) (0.2022) (0.2017)  (0.2023) (0.2066)
Mining 0.1313  0.1263  0.1203 0.1277 0.1311 0.1265 0.1361 
 (0.0204)  (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0204)  (0.0205) (0.0232)
Building  -0.0488  -0.0541 -0.0584 -0.0524 -0.0488 -0.0557 -0.0395 
 (0.0333)  (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333)  (0.0333) (0.0395)
Credit  0.1313  0.1513 0.1264 0.1482 0.1305 0.1524 0.1319 
 (0.0174)  (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0175)  (0.0177) (0.0175)
Traffic 0.0735  0.0673  0.0625 0.0692 0.0745 0.0661 0.0786 
 (0.0199)  (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200)  (0.0200) (0.0232)  36
Retail  0.0220  0.0176 0.0020 0.0203 0.0227 0.0165 0.0338 
 (0.0236)  (0.0236) (0.0239) (0.0236) (0.0236)  (0.0236) (0.0360)
Hotel  0.0280  0.0160 0.0072 0.0197 0.0297 0.0146 0.0432 
 (0.0543)  (0.0543) (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.0543)  (0.0543) (0.0645)
Education  sector  -0.3200  -0.3299 -0.3478 -0.3266 -0.3185 -0.3307 -0.3072 
 (0.0570)  (0.0572) (0.0573) (0.0572) (0.0570)  (0.0572) (0.0642)
Service  0.1278  0.1178 0.1070 0.1209 0.1301 0.1150 0.1399 
 (0.0215)  (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0216) (0.0216)  (0.0217) (0.0353)
Welfare  0.0222  0.0083 -0.0170 0.0110 0.0229 0.0072 0.0406 
 (0.0257)  (0.0259) (0.0265) (0.0258) (0.0258)  (0.0258) (0.0498)
Public  utility  0.1604  0.1449 0.1283 0.1493 0.1618 0.1434 0.1755 
 (0.0180)  (0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0181) (0.0180)  (0.0181) (0.0391)
Constant  -3.9959  -3.4355 -3.3426 -3.6146 -4.1082 -3.4132 -4.3153 
   (0.1134)  (0.1631) (0.1549) (0.1370) (0.1566)  (0.1398) (0.7455)
          
Log Likelihood  -53034.6  -53023.3 -53016.0 -53022.7 -53034.0  -53010.5 -53034.5
LR test of rho=0 (P-Value)  <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001
Number of observations  3,867,569 
Number of individuals  1,115,437 
Note: Random-effects Probit (coefficients). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ‘LR’ denotes Likelihood-
Ratio. 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Table A.4: Random-effects Probit results for quit probability for observations in firms with quits  
Quit = 1  x   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
abs














jt w   4.6868  -0.001458*** 
(0.00021)        
ˆ
inside
ijt w   4.6858     -0.0024*** 
(0.00027)      
rank
ijt w   0.4929      0.0009153*** 
(0.00012)     
range
ijt w   0.6819       -0.001201*** 
(0.00017)    
CDF
ijt w   0.5100         0.000903*** 
(0.00012)   
ˆ
outside
it w   4.6500           -0.0019816** 
(0.00092) 
Control variables    yes yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
              
) | 1 Pr( x y      0.00121433 0.00120318 0.00120544 0.00120382  0.00120752  0.00120174  0.00121523 
Number of obs.    1,339,892 
Number of indiv.    569,639 
Note: Sample includes only observations of firms with at least one quitting worker in a year. Random-effects Probit (marginal effects at x ). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Table A.5: Descriptive statistics for mobile individuals 
Variable Mean  Std.  Deviation

new old
it ww    0.0336 0.1552 
Wage Cut = 1  0.2847  0.4513 

new old
it rank rank    -0.0312 0.2573 

new old
it range range    0.0034 0.2045 

new old
it CDF CDF    -0.0325 0.2536 
Secondary school leaving certificate  0.0641  0.2449 
Secondary school leaving certificate and apprenticeship   0.8077  0.3941 
(Technical) college entrance qualification   0.0121  0.1092 
(Technical) college entrance qualification and apprenticeship  0.1161  0.3204 
Mobility to larger establishment  0.5603  0.4964 
Blue-collar to white-collar transition  0.0434  0.2038 
Potential experience  17.9665  6.3326 
Potential experience squared  362.8906  227.8344 
Year: 1996  0.0674  0.2508 
Year: 1997  0.0673  0.2506 
Year: 1998  0.0645  0.2456 
Year: 1999  0.0975  0.2966 
Year: 2000  0.1563  0.3632 
Year: 2001  0.1344  0.3411 
Year: 2002  0.0796  0.2708 
Year: 2003  0.0722  0.2588 
Year: 2004  0.1382  0.3451 
Year: 2005  0.1225  0.3279 
    
Number of observations  7,785 
Number of individuals  7,516 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Table A.6: Probit results for acceptance of wage cuts for job switches between 
large establishments 
Wage Cut = 1  x (1) (2) (3) 

new old
it rank rank    -0.0193 -0.8861***    
   (0.0556)    

new old
it range range    0.0062   -1.0497***   
     (0.0681)   

new old
it CDF CDF    -0.0201     -0.9389***
       (0.0570) 
Secondary school leaving  0.0894  reference reference reference 
certificate        
Secondary school leaving  0.7973  -0.2094*** -0.1538***  -0.2126***
certificate and apprenticeship   (0.0389)  (0.0399)  (0.0391) 
(Technical) college entrance   0.0110  -0.1301*  -0.0887  -0.1127* 
qualification   (0.04818)  (0.0700)  0.0492 
(Technical) college entrance   0.1023  -0.1953*** -0.1730***  -0.1882***
qualification and apprenticeship    (0.0193)  (0.0255)  (0.0196) 
Potential experience  17.8107  0.0009  -0.0038  0.0063 
   (0.0096)  (0.0100)  (0.0099) 
Potential experience squared  349.2447  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0003 
   (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
        
Annual dummies    yes  yes  yes 
        
Pseudo R
2   0.2053  0.1463  0.2252 
) | 1 Pr( x y      0.2082 0.2240 0.2029 
Number of Observations    2,092 
Note: Sample includes only observations who change firms within the highest 
establishment size class (more than 1000 employees). Probit (marginal effects at x ). 
Robust standard errors clustered for 2,022 individuals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Tables and figures included in text 
 
Table 1: Recent studies about job mobility and wages 
    Mobility (in percent) ... 








Fitzenberger and Garloff 
(2007) 
Germany 
(IABS)  22.2 - 24.5  3.8 - 7.1  70.7 - 72.7 
        
Jolivet et al. (2006)  Germany 
(ECHP)  36.3 3.3 60.4 
U.S. 
(PSID)  23.3 21.1 55.6 
        
Nosal and Rupert (2007)  U.S. 
(PSID)  42.1 - 42.4  8.4 - 4.8  49.5- 52.8 
Note: Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) refer to establishment-to-establishment transitions 
between two successive years. The authors use different subsamples for their analysis on 
wage cuts which do not differ much. Nosal and Rupert (2007) consider individuals who report 
an employer change. Jolivet et al. (2006) define mobility as job-to-job transition if the interval 
between jobs was one month or less (Germany) or less than three weeks (U.S.). 
‘IABS’: IAB employment subsample 1975-2001. 
‘ECHP’: European Community Household Panel Survey. 
‘PSID’: Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
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Table 2: Definition of wage measures 
abs
ijt w   Log wage of individual i 
in period t in 
establishment j 
abs
ijt ijt w ln(Wage )   
jt w   Average log wage paid 










N         
N: number of employees in our sample  
inside
ijt w ˆ   Predicted comparison 
wage in own 
establishment (given 
individual 
characteristics) in period 
t 
Annual regression for establishment j: 
inside
ijt j it ˆˆ ˆ w' X    
X: potential experience (squared), dummies for 
occupation, and schooling 
rank
ijt w   Ordinal relative wage 
position of individual i 
in establishment j in 
period t 
1 rank   wage








ijt w  
Workers with equal wages within establishment j have 
the same rank. In such cases we calculate the average 
rank of workers with same wages. For example, if the 
two lowest paid workers are paid the same, both 
employees exhibit a non-normalized wage rank of 1.5. 
range
ijt w   Cardinal relative wage 
position of individual i 















ijt w   Empirical cumulative 
distribution function 
(CDF) of wijt in 
establishment j in period 
t 
  ) Pr( ijt jt
CDF
ijt w W w    
Wjt is the set of wages within establishment j in period t. 
wijt denotes the individual wage of individual i working in 
establishment j in period t. 
outside
it ˆ w   Predicted comparison 
wage across all 
individuals in all firms 
(given individual 
characteristics) in period 
t 
Annual regression:  
12
outside
it it it it ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ w' X S A      
X: potential experience (squared), dummies for 
occupation and schooling; A: regional dummies; S: 
sector. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations of wage measures 
  Mean (x )  Correlation coefficients 
Variable  (Std.dev.) 
abs
ijt w   jt w  
inside
ijt w ˆ  
rank
ijt w  
range
ijt w  
CDF




ijt w   4.6437 
(0.2414)  1             
jt w  
4.6415 
(0.1585)  0.6476*** 1           
inside
ijt w ˆ   4.6414  
(0.2048)  0.8403*** 0.7687*** 1         
rank
ijt w   0.5002 
(0.2837)  0.6750*** -0.0407*** 0.3689*** 1       
range
ijt w   0.6309 
(0.2371)  0.8116*** 0.4033*** 0.6353*** 0.6521***  1     
CDF
ijt w   0.5127 
(0.2954)  0.7064*** 0.0151*** 0.4099*** 0.9721***  0.6775*** 1   
outside
it ˆ w   4.6378 
(0.1701)  0.6838*** 0.4971*** 0.8133*** 0.4277***  0.5178*** 0.4552*** 1 
                 
Number of 
observations  3,867,569 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Table 4: Random-effects Probit results for quit probability 
Quit = 1  x   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
abs














jt w   4.6415  -0.0002428***
(0.00005)       
ˆ
inside
ijt w   4.6414    -0.000363*** 
(0.00006)      
rank
ijt w   0.5002      0.0001398***
(0.00003)     
range
ijt w   0.6309         -0.0000444 
(0.00004)    
CDF
ijt w   0.5127         0.0001979*** 
(0.00003)   
ˆ
outside
it w   4.6378          0.0000995 
(0.00023) 
Control variables  
(see Table A.2) 
  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
            
) | 1 Pr( x y      0.00034897  0.00034621 0.00034541 0.00034595 0.00034904 0.00034493 0.00034886 
Number of obs.   3,867,569 
Number of individuals   1,115,437 
Note: Random-effects Probit (marginal effects at x ). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The corresponding 
coefficients of the Probit estimates and the complete results are presented in Table A.3. Table A.2 contains descriptive statistics. 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for consequences of quits 
   Mean  Std.  Deviation 

new old
it ww   
all 0.0336  0.1552 
wage cut  -0.1171  0.1419 
wage markup  0.0936  0.1140 

new old
it rank rank   
all -0.0312  0.2573 
wage cut  -0.1747  0.2682 
wage markup  0.0260  0.2291 

new old
it range range   
all 0.0034  0.2045 
wage cut  -0.1110  0.2083 
wage markup  0.0489  0.1841 

new old
it CDF CDF   
all -0.0325  0.2536 
wage cut  -0.1861  0.2538 
wage markup  0.0286  0.2263 
Note: 7,785 transitions of 7,516 individuals are observed. 5,569 moves are 
executed to higher wages and 2,216 moves to lower wages (wage cut).  











-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Wage cut Wage Markup
CDF(new) - CDF(old)
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Table 6: Linear regression results for wage change 

new old
it ww    (1) (2) (3) 

new old
it rank rank    0.2377***   
 (0.0108)     

new old
it range range     0.3443***  
   (0.0136)  

new old
it CDF CDF       0.2586*** 
     (0.0105) 
Secondary school leaving  reference reference reference 
certificate      
Secondary school leaving  0.0122*  0.0122*  0.0121* 
certificate and apprenticeship (0.0066)  (0.0068)  (0.0066) 
(Technical) college entrance   0.0255*  0.0181  0.0234* 
qualification (0.0139)  (0.0122)  (0.0139) 
(Technical) college entrance   0.0123  0.0105  0.0092 
qualification and apprenticeship  (0.0077)  (0.0078)  (0.0077) 
Mobility to larger establishment  0.0465*** 0.0165*** 0.0457*** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0041)  (0.0043) 
Potential experience  -0.0044*** -0.0032**  -0.0045*** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0016) 
Potential experience squared  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0570*** 0.0408*** 0.0605*** 
 (0.0161)  (0.0161)  (0.0160) 
      
Annual dummies  yes  yes  yes 
      
R
2 0.1896  0.2335  0.2125 
Number of observations  7,785 
Note: OLS (coefficients). Robust standard errors clustered for 7,516 
individuals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Table A.5 
contains descriptive statistics. 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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Table 7: Probit results for acceptance of wage cuts 
Wage Cut = 1  (1)  (2)  (3) 

new old
it rank rank    -0.6534***   
 (0.0252)     

new old
it range range     -0.8496***  
   (0.0304)   

new old
it CDF CDF       -0.7315*** 
     (0.0255) 
Secondary school leaving  reference reference reference 
certificate      
Secondary school leaving  -0.0803*** -0.0883*** -0.0824*** 
certificate and apprenticeship (0.0216)  (0.0229)  (0.0217) 
(Technical) college entrance   -0.1459*** -0.1368*** -0.1387*** 
qualification (0.0337)  (0.0343)  (0.0343) 
(Technical) college entrance   -0.1659*** -0.1681*** -0.1606*** 
qualification and apprenticeship  (0.0170)  (0.0172)  (0.0171) 
Mobility to larger establishment  -0.0746*** -0.0022  -0.0737*** 
 (0.0115)  (0.0126)  (0.0116) 
Potential experience  0.0022  0.0021  0.0037 
 (0.0047)  (0.0046)  (0.0047) 
Potential experience squared  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0002 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
      
Annual dummies  yes  yes  yes 
      
Pseudo R
2 0.1283  0.1297  0.1480 
) | 1 Pr( x y    0.2591 0.2584 0.2543 
Number of observations  7,785 
Note: Probit (marginal effects at x ). Robust standard errors clustered for 
7,516 individuals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Table 
A.5 contains descriptive statistics. 
Source: Cross-sectional model of the LIAB (Years 1996-2005). 
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